The post-colonial desire is the desire of de-colonized communities for an identity.”
(During 1996:125)

“Regimes of Classification and the Paradox of Kamchadal Heritage”

In 1947 a paper was published in the Soviet journal Dal’nii Vostok reviewing recent Soviet research on minority peoples of the far east. The author reported that in the field of paleoasiatic studies, scientists had “eliminated the persistent confusion between Kamchadals (ethnically mixed [metizirovannye] population of Kamchatka) and Itel’men” (Sergeev 1947:84). Both groups, Kamchadals and Itel’mens, live on the Kamchatka Peninsula, which juts down, from Chukotka, into the North Pacific, on Russia’s easternmost frontier. The confusion between the groups was cleared up by establishing Kamchadals as a “metis” group distinct from aboriginal Itel’mens. This distinction, between the truly indigenous population called Itel’mens and the assimilated, intermarried Itel’men population called Kamchadals, is widely accepted today in Kamchatka. As an achievement, this terminological slight-of-hand successfully addresses the sentiment of this paper’s epitaph. By identifying the frontier, creole population of Itel’men/Russians as a distinct group, assigning them an officially recognized identity, the scientific authorities formalized what had until then been an ambiguous and lingering artifact of Russian expansion. This paper examines the origins of this conceptual distinction (indigenous vs. assimilated) and the contemporary implications that it holds for minority peoples throughout the Russian north.
Following a brief summary of the general context, this paper considers three examples of what I am calling here “regimes of classification,” that is, three different systems of measurement according to which the Kamchadal/Itel’men border has been discerned. Finally, I will reconsider the terms set out in this paper’s epigraph, namely, I will ask if the “post-colonial desire” if indeed for an identity, or simply for a community.

When the first Russian settlers encountered indigenous Itel’mens in Kamchatka, and began to take wives from the native population, the persistent confusion began. Soon there was a mixed race population that spoke Russian better than it spoke Itel’men, but there was also a population of Russian settlers who had abandoned Russian farming and had in many ways “gone native.” The creole, frontier, mixed ethnicity that emerged go by the name Kamchadal today, and while they were officially declared to be not indigenous in 1927, and thus passed through the Soviet era classified as Russians, they have been, since 1991, counted as members of an indigenous group.

The central paradox becomes clear very quickly. With something of a consensus in the scholarly and bureaucratic communities about the appearance of a distinct, third “metis” ethnic group called Kamchadals, and with the 1991 decision to declare them an indigenous group with access to the entitlements of that classification, the political problem is posed: how to project an indigenous heritage based on the idea of a frontier creole community?

For Kamchadals, this acknowledged lack of cultural purity proved to be detrimental to efforts to secure greater access to land and resources. Herein lies the crux of my research. Nationalist discourses typically link doctrines of cultural purity with
political claims for national sovereignty, with this equation evident today in nationalist movements throughout the former Soviet Union. What about groups whose boundaries are more difficult to discern and who thus fail to satisfy the logic of such an argument? Via what measures and signs would Kamchadals demarcate a commonality that could be distinguished from both Russian and Itel’men?

**What the visitor saw**

The murky boundaries mentioned at the outset of the paper, supposedly “solved” in 1947, are a hallmark of travelogues from Kamchatka. Nearly everyone who wrote about their trip to Kamchatka came around to the subject of confounding ethnic distinctions. My favorite account is from a botanist, especially concerned with classification perhaps. Reflecting on a scientific expedition in Kamchatka in 1908, Vladimir Komarov observed that

One frequently wonders who you are seeing in front of yourself – a Russian or a Kamchadal – they have mixed so much and live an identical life, with identical clothes and appearance. Even where the residents themselves consider themselves to be pure-blooded descendants of aborigines, it is hard to discern what their distinctive characteristics are since they resemble each other so little. Therefore, generally for them, as for Russians, everyday traits are now more common than any lingering specificities or anthropological particularities (Komarov 1912:105).

Komarov’s comments come at the outset of an unusually detailed account of the annual cycles of the Kamchadal economy, and deserve special scrutiny because he appears to be especially interested in gauging the difference between Kamchadals and Russians. At this
point, it is important to ask: On what basis was Komarov (and other outside observers from that era) making his assessments of ethnicity? It appears that Komarov, the botanist, worked with the widely held assumption that it should be possible to ascribe a single cultural identity to any individual, based on “specificities” and “particularities.” He also seemed perplexed by the variation that he found within what he apparently expected to be a more homogenous group (“they resemble each other so little”). It is instructive to consider closely Komarov’s appraisal, and to keep in mind that it is the work of a botanist. His work clearly exemplifies a widespread classificatory logic running roughshod over the “data” as he clings to the notion that “types” are not organizational constructs, but instead correspond to lived realities.

For example, in his survey of the architecture in Kamchatkan villages, Komarov mentioned a range of structures including typical Russian style homes and distinctively Kamchatkan storage sheds (*ambarchiki* and *shaiby*). He also described homes constructed out of abandoned shipping crates still bearing their American labels, some roofed with corrugated galvanized tin, also from the US, and others on which pounded out kerosene containers had been used as tin siding. He ended his list with “the most characteristic part of a Kamchatka village, that is, *balagany*”(108). *Balagany* are dual purpose structures that consist of a single-room dwelling perched about twenty feet above the ground, resting on a series of tall support poles. The space below the elevated platform is used for hanging fish to dry since they are protected there from rain above and from dogs below.

Komarov’s description continued when he differentiated three types of *balagany*, a classification that was meant to show that under Russian influence these structures were
less often used as dwellings and were at the time increasingly becoming simply devices for drying fish. Introducing *balagany*, Komarov remarked that “Obviously, we have here a local variant of one of the most ancient types of human dwelling” (112), and what is clear from his analysis is that moves away from such signature differences are crucial measures of loss and assimilation.

What is particularly noteworthy however, is that the scene Komarov described seeing in 1908, complete with fish being dried under *balagany*, dog teams used in winter for hunting and travel, and other crucial markers of indigenous Kamchatkan heritage still prevalent, would be considered, by the measures used today, undeniably “indigenous.” The persistence of claims such as Komarov’s, that the contemporary forms he saw were derivatives of a golden age of pristine aboriginality, suggest not so much a state of decline, but a state of being defined as permanently inhabiting the condition of decline

**Metric Books**

At the same time that Komarov was conducting his research in Kamchatka, another body of data was being compiled in villages throughout the peninsula that today is the most important evidence in disputes over ethnicity. This data is contained in what are called “Metric Books” [*metricheskii knigi*], church log books recording births, marriages and deaths within each parish. The key data in these books are in the identity category, where some people are listed as Kamchadal. In order to be officially considered Kamchadal today, people must be able to trace direct lineage to an individual in the book who was classified as Kamchadal over a century ago.
In terms of today’s politics, the problem with the metric books is that the priests who were marking the identities of their parishioners in the nineteenth-century apparently did not regard Kamchadal as a racial or ethnic term, as it is being treated by the state today, but as a socio-economic category. Thus, to be listed as Kamchadal in the church records was less an ethnic distinction, in the sense that we understand ethnicity today, than it was an assignment to a social estate (soslovie). Here is where it becomes clear how shifts in modes of ethno-social classification in the Russian-Soviet-Russian state have been ignored under the current policy.

_Sosloviia_ were not ethnic groups but state categories that differentiated the population in terms of an individuals’ rights and obligations toward the state. Imperial Russia was organized according to such estates, the most common of which were nobility, clergy, urban estates and peasantry. In pre-Petrine Russia, there were not estates, or legally proscribed groupings, but there were extensive divisions and classifications such that according to one lexicon from the era, there were nearly 500 separate categories of people, sorted by rank, status, obligation and entitlement (Freeze 1986). This system was fragmented, did not resemble a single hierarchy as much as an aggregate of variously entwined echelons, and took the form of what Freeze calls an “orderless order.” In some contexts, notably urban ones and within the ranks of state employees, the subtle gradations between various estates could be seen as materialized charts mapping orders of prestige and hierarchy. In rural contexts, serfdom was perhaps the most rigid case of status being enforced by law. The estate “system” took shape only in the nineteenth-century, and continued to evolve as it was the subject of numerous reform efforts. In the context of Siberian peoples, what is important is the transformation of what, in the
eighteenth century was essentially a census tool for counting individual males and keeping track of tax obligations, into a conceptual apparatus that could be applied to larger populations.

During the nineteenth-century the *soslovie* system changed as categories and strata were repeatedly rearranged, and gradually this system of “estates” became enmeshed with a growing class system toward the end of the century. Thus, by the early twentieth century, Russia was marked by widespread contradiction and confusion regarding the constitution and interrelations between various segments of the population. Even in the nineteenth-century, Freeze has cautioned that “the flux – and confusion – in the state’s terminology should evoke more caution toward assumptions about its central role in ‘legislating’ social development; important as the state’s influence may have been, other factors – cultural, economic, social – were of equal if not greater import” (Freeze 1986:35). Official state ascriptions of estate (*soslovie*) became increasingly irrelevant to individuals’ actual occupations (*sostoianiiia*). Around the turn of the century, for example, there was a “growing number of industrial workers born in cities who were still legally ascribed to the peasantry, even after they lost (especially in the wake of the Stolypin land reforms) any tangible ties to the countryside and to the land” (Haimson 1986:2).

For Siberian native peoples there was a range of classificatory labels that led to similar confusions. The most common blanket label for the Siberian natives encountered by Russians was *inorodtsy*, which can be translated either as “native” or “alien.” Beyond this term though, there were others that made more specific distinctions. For example, as “alien” subjects of the tsar, Siberian natives were required to pay a “tribute” or fur tax,
known as *iasak*. Some tsarist era census reports from Siberia record not the population of natives but the number of “*iasachnie liudi,***” or *iasak* paying native men (Muralshko 1994; Sokolovskii 1998; Dolgikh 1960). Another central concern for Russians in their expansion westward was the propagation of Orthodoxy, thus there was also frequent reference to *inovertsy* (“other believers,” i.e. non-Orthodox). One way to avoid the fur tax was to convert to Orthodoxy, thus shedding both the “*iasachnye***” and “*inovertsy***” labels. Converted natives however still remained “*inorodtsy,***” since the sense of difference that this term carried with it connoted more than just religious belief.

Beyond the obvious fact that there will always be dubious “conversions” when such financial rewards as tax exemptions await the convert, there were other differences between Russians and Siberians that were not easily overcome by religious conversion. Slezkine has suggested that the lingering difference “seemed to begin with food (because) dietary taboos defined ones’ own community as distinct from “savages,” foreigners” or other “nonhumans.” In the case of Kamchatka, such a formulation is confused by the widespread tendency of Russian settlers to adopt the local diet. Russian farming proved to be a struggle in the sub-arctic conditions, and the extreme abundance of fish and game in Kamchatka made subsistence practices far more productive in comparison. Slezkine also mentions that related to food are the activities surrounding the production of food, and thus Russianness and alienness were both constituted in part by a “certain relationship to the land” (1994:174-175). As with food, when Russians moved to Siberia they tended to adopt the local relationship to the land instead of implementing their own. In this regard, the colonization of Kamchatka differs from more conventional operations in which outsiders imposed novel systems of labor and land use such as
plantations or factories. Dobell, for example, writing in 1830, bemoaned the tendency of Russians to abandon “civilization” upon arriving in Kamchatka

Instead of drawing the native to their mode of living and industry, [the Russian settlers] neglect everything like civilization, and are themselves now quite as wild and uncouth as the Kamchadals, besides being infinitely more vicious” (Dobell 1970:51).

Another interesting point of comparison that Dobell provides is that while so many others observed the Kamchadals adopting Russian customs and remarked on the absences of “original” or “ancient” Kamchadal traditions, Dobell concentrates on exactly the opposite. In any event, both perspectives present problems for a nuanced classification of the local population and call into question the guidelines used in the formulation of the various categories used in the metric books. Considering the flux of the estate system, the high rates of intermarriage and the tendency of Russians to adopt the Kamchadal lifestyle (and vice versa), what can be gleaned today from the identity terms ascribed by village priests in the nineteenth-century?

The most important point is that they were emphatically not racial categorizations. This is the strangest element of the current policy which is that it appears to translate characterizations that were been made on the basis of religion, occupation, literacy and prosperity and using them in a project of racial classification today. For example, even a quick scan down the column calling for “nationality” in the metric books reveals the central problem as it contains at least one individual classified as each of the following: “hunter,” “teacher,” “Russian,” “Kamchadal,” “peasant,” “Ukrainian.” According to the current policies, the only people who can today be officially considered Kamchadal are
those who can trace a direct link, via documents such as marriage licenses and birth certificates, to an individual classified as a “Kamchadal.”

**LANGUAGE**

Finally, I want to bring in a quick example that shows something of the ways in which the boundaries that I have been discussing are experienced locally, by people who identify as Kamchadal, but are well outside of the politicized minority. Stories about the meaning of Kamchadal difference, especially those told by older people, tended not to emphasize political sentiments as much as social and familial ones. Thus, while the official rhetoric involving land claims and metric books is saturated in politics, asserting an indigenous heritage locally often hinged not on “political” sentiments, but on seemingly innocuous forms of nostalgia and the resurrection of a “structure of feeling” (Williams 1977). For example, while I often asked people what they thought the positive outcomes of the end of the Soviet Union would be, I was surprised by one woman who told me that the best thing she could think of was that an old childhood friend had, purely by the chance and dislocation typical of the 1990s, once again become her neighbor.

The two women now spent long hours chatting in each other’s kitchens, speaking what Liudmila described as “Kamchadal” language.

We [Kamchadals] have an entirely different accent. A Russian shows up and you have to start speaking correctly. For us it was really difficult, especially when we were young girls, because our parents talked that way. It really tormented us because we were speaking *Kamchadalskii*, and when the Russians showed up, in school especially, we started trying to change.²
It is true that both spoke Russian with a characteristic “Kamchadal” accent, which has been noted and described in detail by various observers including Liudmila’s folklorist daughter. It is also likely that out of shame and practice they concealed the Kamchadal elements of their speech while I was with them. When she discussed her Kamchadal accent and I asked her to demonstrate, she offered a few sentences but then burst out with self-conscious laughter, as if there were something hopelessly rustic and unrefined about it. I took this partly as a sign of distrust and unfamiliarity but felt that it also pointed to a recognition of insurmountable differences, both temporal and experiential. Her habitual tendency to conceal markers of Kamchadal-ness in the presence of others, as well as the decades that separated her struggles with the language and our conversations, outweighed any common ground that the two of us may have found.

Even after I got married to my first husband, all the same the words [Kamchadal words] would fly out of my mouth and I would personally turn red, I was ashamed. Because they demanded that we speak properly, but I just couldn’t do it. By the 1950s I had gotten married, and the girls would gather on the street say, to talk … I was a young girl too, pretty and all, and I would go up to them to talk, but I just couldn’t say anything. I would listen to them, but myself, I would stand there quietly. I was afraid that I would start to say something and a Kamchadal word would suddenly fly out of my mouth, I’d mix up my consonants.

The image of Kamchadal elements uncontrollably and embarrassingly flying about, and Liudmila’s relative comfort with that possibility today, presents a compelling metaphor for the shift in state power, and also for the process of aging. The changes that have taken place in Liudmila’s own sense of her “Kamchadalness” offer a clear example of the transience and ambiguity of the category “Kamchadal.” Though she made every effort in
her youth to eradicate signs of Kamchadal heritage, she is now regarded as a Kamchadal “speaker,” as a person who is Kamchadal by any measure. Vakhtin has referred to a process of “regressive restoration” which perpetuates the impression that only a small population of elderly people speak a language that is on the verge of extinction (1997). Regressive restoration refers to the process whereby the oldest living generation, against a background of a dominant other (Russians) returns to modes of communication “that they seemingly had forgotten long ago” (84). While Liudmila clearly did everything that she could when she was young to encourage the idea that Russian was the only language spoken in the area her renewed use of “Kamchadalskii” in the 1990s suggests how language use, and cultural “accents” more broadly, can linger quietly in the background during a person’s life, remaining available for restoration. The fact that the language she has restored consists principally of Russian words and hinges largely on accent is not directly relevant to the significance she and her friend attribute to it. In addition, her emphasis on conversation as a new source of pleasure marked a perspective not found in more politicized, not to mention official bureaucratic discussions of revitalization or tradition.

While Liudmila now seeks comfort in conversation with her friend, and enjoys letting the Kamchadal words fly, there are plenty of young people that I met, including one of Liudmila’s granddaughters, who were involved in the same struggle of effacement that she had confronted in the 1950s. Just as she did when she was younger, Kamchadal children and teenagers today routinely practice the same gestures of self-effacement and denial. On more than one occasion, older Kamchadals told me that their children or
grandchildren did not “want to be” Kamchadal, and during interviews, they would often leave the room claiming that only “babushka” knew about such things.

This example is meant to demonstrate how even in a single household one could find clear examples of the tensions and ambiguities surrounding the embodiment of the category “Kamchadal.” The archive’s Metric Books play no role here, where the older women’s pleasure in a rekindled friendship and the opportunity it offered them to relish an accent they had worked so hard to exorcise contrasts sharply with the granddaughter’s disavowal of any knowledge about things Kamchadal. It was precisely these nuances that highlighted the constant gestures of effacement and the sub-surface quality that I found to be so characteristic of Kamchadal history.

**Conclusion (Allegories of Identity)**

In the introduction, I stated that one outcome of the Soviet Union’s dissolution was the expectation of heightened “visibility” for non-Russians. In subsequent chapters, I examined various arenas and processes through which Kamchadals have been made, and have made themselves, both visible and invisible at different times. I have emphasized throughout that the very existence of the “group” known as Kamchadals has depended largely on the means of measurement, and that the novelty of this case lies largely in the fact that Kamchadals have repeatedly turned out to be not entirely legible as an ethnic minority yet never entirely invisible either. According to various measures, Kamchadals have often registered as different enough to be noted, but somehow not sufficiently different to be recognized as such.

Ambiguity promises to be an enduring feature of Kamchadal politics at least into the near future. Kamchadal-ness continues to be as meaningful a marker of identity as it
has ever been. Aside from legislating “it” into existence, relatively little has been done to establish Kamchadals as a group. Not only is there no assigned “national” territory for Kamchadals, and no experienced core of trained elites, but many Kamchadals remain ambivalent about whether, how and even why to proceed with asserting, or making visible, “the” Kamchadals.

This paper’s epilogue, During’s assertion that “The post-colonial desire is the desire of de-colonized communities for an identity,” is relevant here precisely because applying it to the case of Kamchadals problematizes both the assertion, and the idea of a Kamchadal “community.” At one level, this assertion rings true as so much of global politics, post-colonial and otherwise, is structured by the logic of identity politics. The idioms of nationalism, including emphases on borders, boundaries and “ethnic” groups, organize political processes worldwide, both within and between nations. In this sense, During’s assertion rings especially true as there is a pervasive desire to emulate conventional, naturalized national forms because it is through such forms that some of the most powerful and politically viable forms of “identity” are generated. Thus there is a global congruence in aspirations for the expression of national identity. At the same time however, it is unclear that these aspirations, and the desires that inspire them, are widely shared by any given “community,” and it is here that During’s claim falls short. It seems more appropriate to locate the desire During refers to in specific arenas and among specific actors, namely post-colonial elites such as nationalist intellectuals and those that Brubaker has called “nation-invoking … political entrepreneurs” (1996:16). Outside of such official realms, anxiety about “identity” takes on a distinctly different character. Based on my research, I would suggest that many Kamchadals, to the extent that they can
be said to constitute a post-colonial community, longed not for an identity, but for a community.

Anxieties about Kamchadal “identity” have historically been brought in from outside the community. It is not as accurate to say that Kamchadals desire an identity, as it is to ascribe the desire for Kamchadal identity to ethnographers, census workers and legislative committees charged with zoning, mapping and allocating resource use rights. Many Kamchadals had little to say about Kamchadal identity, and responded almost quizically to my questions on the subject. When I asked about historical change, I was more frequently told about the demise of community, broadly conceived, than about ethnic politics or an absence of identity. The point here is that the metric books, census reports and other official modes of measurement examined here are not testaments to Kamchadal anxieties about their own identity.

Ultimately, Kamchadal politics center on the question of “legibility,” and derive their tension from the fact that state means of “seeing” minority ethnic groups render Kamchadals largely invisible. “Seeing” constituent groups within the nation, or along its borders, is a prerequisite for any kind of engagement with them. While the dissolution of the Soviet Union has produced a “living encyclopedia” of the “many facets and many varieties” of nationalism (Khazanov 1995:xv), it is important to emphasize the uniformity of expression exhibited throughout the “encyclopedia.” It is important to remember that to speak of “national minorities” and “emergent national groups” is to speak the language of states and not necessarily to refer to broadly felt experiences. Such terms “designate a political stance, not an ethnodemographic fact,” which is to say that they are categories of political practice which structure perception, organize discourse and political action.
rather than describe stable, clearly bounded groups. (Brubaker 1996:5-7). Thus, “legibility” for an ethnic minority hinges on being seen as such, and thus on actively appearing to be an ethnic minority. It is a dialogic process of seeing and appearing, with appearing here understood to be an active process, at least partly volitional. The case of Kamchadals is especially interesting precisely because they have had such difficulty appearing as a legible minority group. As a result, this case offers a clear perspective on the different modes of measurement simultaneously at play, and throughout I have sought to emphasize the incongruities between state measures of ethnicity and those modes of understanding and experiencing Kamchadal identity that were most pervasive among Kamchadals themselves. Such difference between the various registers and measures of identity are often overlooked, with the official expression granted a privileged status. During’s position is especially instructive here because it draws on the injustices of colonial domination, underscoring the widespread sentiment that post-colonial communities deserve recognition precisely because colonial regimes so often deny it. However, it is important to distinguish between the voice of ethnic self-determination, what is often the political rhetoric of minority entitlement or insurgent nationalism, and the actual existence of ethnic groups constituted by specifically identifiable individuals. An ethnic group is easily conjured in rhetoric, but discerning facts on the ground is more difficult.

Consider the following scene. At a large family dinner to celebrate a birthday, the family’s patriarch, a Kamchadal man, raised the subject of passports and the idea of changing his passport to indicate that he was Kamchadal not Russian. His wife, who was Russian, his children and their spouses were all rather circumspect. Both of his daughters
had married Russians, one from Kamchatka, the other from Moscow. One of his sons was unmarried, one married to a Kazakh woman and the other to a Russian. There were five grandchildren. Within the family there were the usual tensions, with the additional that some were inflected with ethnicity. For example, the Moscow son-in-law was prone to heavy drinking and when his wife complained about it, he demeaned her with the epithet “Kamchadal.” He used the term to mean “stupid” and “unsophisticated” and this was common knowledge throughout the family. In addition, the relationship between the Kazakh wife and her mother-in-law was strained. Within such a family, it seems less appropriate to dwell on the absence of “identity” than to concentrate on the ways in which such a community can be formed and sustained. For example, when the older woman explained the tension in ethnic terms, including herself as a Kamchadal when she said that “We are a Kamchadal family and she looks down on us,” it was clear that “Kamchadal” and “we” were not being used in any conventionally ethnic sense.

Within the terms laid out by the Russian state, there could be marginal benefits, such as potential scholarships, for the grandchildren if they were classified as Kamchadal as opposed to Russian or Kazakh. The patriarch was interested in having himself re-classified largely out of pride. He and I had discussed the possibility many times and he seemed to anticipate some satisfaction from officially announcing his heritage after decades of downplaying it for the sake of Russians like his Moscovite son-in-law. His children however, in their 30s and early 40s, could anticipate neither pleasure nor advantage from making the switch. In any event, this example serves here as a reminder that within the context of identity politics, the only unequivocal identities are the naively singular ones ascribed by states and measured in projects such as census reports.
I want to turn briefly to these ascribed identities, because it is only through the terms of such ascriptions that official Kamchadal politics can operate. Locally, and in ways that are largely invisible to state measurement, Kamchadal will continue to be a meaningful category. It will continue to organize local experiences, to structure alliances as well as to generate pernicious stereotyping. This will continue to happen regardless of how identity is recorded in passports. However, just as decades of official “invisibility” during the Soviet era did little to erase Kamchadal identity, it is not clear what impact official recognition will have.

I have argued here that Kamchadal identity resides largely in fragmentary experiences, gestures and signs. Lacking official history books, holidays, a column in the census, and many of the other institutionalized elements that constitute the bureaucratic armature of national identity, Kamchadal identity has been most vibrant in vernacular forms. I have come to think of the various instances of “Kamchadalness,” moments of effacement, communities of revitalization and also the measure employed by the state, as allegories of identity. They are each brief fragments that symbolize broader narratives. This is most clear in the example of the Kamchadal festival described in Chapter Six, with the logic of substitution clearly displayed in the process of drafting a deliberately symbolic representation of “Kamchadal Culture.” The idea of allegories of identity can be taken further however, and even the state measures can be seen as symbols, although instead of opening themselves up for interpretation, the allegories of the census and the passport tend to foreclose further inquiry. Throughout this project, there has been a tension between examining Kamchadals as an actual group, and examining the discourses through which Kamchadals have been labelled, measures and identified, essentially the
means through which the “group” has been constituted. By suggesting that these
discourses are allegorical, I aim to underscore the symbolic logic by which they work,
each settling on a different set of criteria, seeking a different constellation of signs by
which to create its object.

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**Endnotes:**

1 “An inorodets is literally, a person ‘of other origin’ (ino=other; rod=birth, origin). To refer to the inhabitants of Siberia as inorodtsy as the Russians commonly did, was to emphasize these peoples’ radical civilizational difference from the Russians themselves” (Slocum 1998:177). See also Khodarkovsky 1997 for fuller discussion.